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I. INTRODUCTION
On the front of its splendorous building the highest court in
1
the land has written, “Equal Justice Under Law.” The statement
begs the question: equal justice for whom? In 1863 President
Lincoln tried to answer this question. In his famous speech
delivered after the Battle of Gettysburg, he stated: “Four score and
seven years ago our fathers brought forth, upon this continent, a
new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition
2
that all men are created equal.” The United States has fallen short
of this statement in its criminal justice system because all men are
not treated equally in a court of law.
The 1960 publication of Harper Lee’s classic novel, To Kill a
Mocking Bird, followed by the motion picture in 1962, brought to
the public’s attention the issues of bias in the criminal justice
3
system that resulted in wrongful convictions. In reading this book,
one must stop and contemplate how many innocent persons have
been falsely convicted due to racial animus within the criminal
justice system. Although the prosecution in this story is fictional,
there is a dearth of actual, comparable prosecutions throughout
† J.D. candidate from Gonzaga University School of Law, 2003; Federal Law
Clerk for the Honorable Edwin M. Kosik, 2003-05; Editor, Gonzaga Law Review,
2002-03. I would like to thank Bryan Stevenson from the Equal Justice Initiative of
Alabama for the motivation and encouragement to write on this subject. I would
also like to thank Professor Al McNeil, Professor David DeWolf, Professor Mark
DeForrest, Jonathan Schmidt, Sara Grewing, Kate Ecklund, Nancy Johnson,
Arthur L. Rizer Jr., 2LT Jesse Ruhl and Mikel Wier for their thoughts on this
project. Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Monique G. Rizer, and
son, Arthur Gabriel Rizer, for their selfless support.
The purpose of this Comment is to suggest and demonstrate the deficiencies in
our criminal justice system. This Author believes that the American system is the
most effective model to date. However, it is not beyond the possibilities of
improvement and it is our duty as patriots to suggest ways to improve the system.
In addition this article is written in the sprit of the Gonzaga University School of
Law mission statement to “encourage [ ] students to learn [and] seek answers not
only to ‘what is’ but ‘what should be.’” GONZAGA UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 2002-03
CATALOG 44.
1. The Supreme Court of the United States, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/. The words articulate the responsibility and
duty of the highest court of the land. Equal Justice Under Law, at
http://www.nlcpi.org/pdf/EqualJusticeUnderLaw.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2002).
“As the guardian and interpreter of the U.S. Constitution, it is the responsibility of
the Supreme Court to protect the rule of law and to ensure that constitutional
protections . . . are applied equally to all citizens.” Id.
2. President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) available
at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/gadd/gadrft.html.
3. HARPER LEE , TO KILL A M OCKING BIRD (Warner Books 1988) (1960).
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this country. In 1986 more than one thousand people were proven
4
to be wrongfully convicted, and several of those were executed.
Moreover, reliable estimates show that the number could exceed
5
eight thousand every year.
This comment will address the issue of the race effect on
wrongful convictions. Part II will discuss the effect of this country’s
history of bias in the courts by analyzing the broader context of
race-motivated laws and the ways in which racism is tolerated in the
system. Part III will briefly describe the effect associated with crossracial identification of eyewitnesses and its impact on wrongful
convictions. Part IV will address the connection between poverty
and wrongful convictions and how this has a direct effect on
minorities due to the disproportionate poverty levels in their
communities. Finally, Part V will address the institutionalized
racism conducted by the criminal justice system’s actors including
lawmakers, prosecutors, judges, and the jury.
II. HISTORICAL VIEW AND EFFECTS OF RACE IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
In order to truly understand why race is such a major factor
when it comes to wrongful convictions, one must discuss the
broader historical context of race in the criminal justice system and
the development of certain laws. Also, one must recognize that
criminal statutes targeting race existed for most of the twentieth
6
century. The administration of punishment, or the lack thereof,
has direct ties to both the race of the offender and the race of the

4. Harvey Gee, Eyewitness Testimony and Cross-Racial Identification, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 835, 835 (2001). See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet,
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 21-86 (1987)
(listing twenty-three persons put to death that were conclusively innocent). See
also, James S. Liebmann, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030,
2052 (2000) (discussing that from 1973 until 1995 the appellate courts throughout
the country heard roughly 300 appeals from death row inmates and reversed 47%
of those capital judgments due to errors in the proceedings).
5. See ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1996). See also State v.
Barton, 998 S.W.2d 19, 30 (Mo. 1999) (stating that “[s]ince 1976, the death
penalty has been reinstated in most states. . . [and since that date] 77 death row
inmates found guilty by unanimous juries have been set free; the number of death
row inmates later found to have been wrongfully convicted is thus about oneseventh of the number of prisoners executed”).
6. Videotape: Innocence and Race (Bryan Stevenson Video Lecture at the
Gonzaga School of Law Wrongful Conviction Course 2002).
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7

victim. For instance, North Carolina had mandatory capital crime
statutes for those cases where a black man was convicted of raping a
8
white woman. In contrast, a white man convicted of the same
9
crime would receive a maximum of one year in prison.
Throughout the legal history of the United States the criminal code
illustrates these types of disparities.
A. The Scottsboro Effect
The issue on racial disparity in the system went un-addressed
for many years. Then, in 1931 the Court decided Powell v.
7. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Repair or Repeal – Report of the Governor’s Commission
of Capital Punishment, 90 ILL . B.J. 304, 307 (2002). (“[A] study conducted . . .
found a statistically significant disparity in the treatment of defendants whose
victims were white rather than African American . . . .”). In another study,
conducted in South Carolina between 1977 and 1981, 321 homicide defendants
who committed capital murder were more likely to face the death penalty by
prosecutors if the victim was white. See Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and
Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 754, 765-67 (1984); see also Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution
Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1327, 1331 (1985)
(indicating that if the victim of a capital crime is white, the death penalty is more
often the punishment than if the victim is a minority); William J. Bowers, The
Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 74
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1067-88 (1984) (stating arbitrariness is rampant
in the use of the death penalty).
8. Susan H. Bitensky, Section 1983: Agent of Peace or Vehicle of Violence Against
Children, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 372 n.61 (2001); Constance R. LeSage, The Death
Penalty for Rape - Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 38 LA. L. REV. 868, 870 n.8 (1978)
(noting that the National Association for Advancement of Color People Legal
Defense Fund lobbied to stop the use of the capital punishment in rape cases
because it suspected that the institution was used against black men for raping
white women); see also G.L. Stelzer, Chemical Castration and the Right to Generate
Ideas: Does the First Amendment Protect The Fantasies of Convicted Pedophiles?, 81 M INN.
L. REV. 1675, 1709 n. 5 (1997) (discussing the history of castration in the Kansas
Territory as punishment for African American men who raped or tried to rape
white women); Barbara Holden-Smith, Inherently Unequal Justice: Interracial Rape and
the Death Penalty, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1571, 1572 (1996) (stating white
slave owners were desperate “to stem the tide of burgeoning black male
citizenship,” thus, “the rise of the mythic Black rapist”).
According to statistics, less than 29% of the Blacks lynched between
1889 and 1918 were accused of either rape or attempted rape.
Moreover, the percentage of lynching victims accused of sexual attacks
on white women decreased over time, even as lynching became
increasingly concentrated in the South and increasingly more
depraved.
Lisa A. Crooms, Speaking Partial Truths and Preserving Power: Deconstructing White
Supremacy, Patriarchy, and the Rape Corroboration Rule in the Interest of Black Liberation,
40 HOW. L.J. 459, 512 n.106 (1997).
9. See Bitensky, supra note 8.
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Alabama, better known as the “Scottsboro Boys Case.” In this
notorious case, nine black men were charged with raping two white
12
girls on a freight train while traveling near Scottsboro, Alabama.
On the day of each trial there was not a definitive defense attorney
in place, and in four one-day trials, eight of the nine were found
13
guilty and received the death penalty. As a consequence of this
injustice, organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union and
the Communist Party became involved in the campaign to vindicate
14
the men or to mitigate their penalties. Publicity generated by this
case prompted an exploration of the effect of race in the judicial
system. The exploration made it clear that race was one of the
15
major obstacles to a fair and just proceeding.
The Justice Department began collecting statistics in 1930
regarding how sentences and criminal prosecutions were being
16
conducted. Their data reinforces the notion that race was a factor
17
in criminal prosecution and punishment. For instance, in
Alabama less than 5% of murders involved black perpetrators and
18
white victims. Most people are astonished to hear this; they
19
expect the number to be much higher. The death rows in
20
Alabama perpetuate the misconception. “Although 67% of all
murder victims in the State of Alabama are black, 84% of all people
10. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
11. Id. at 49-51.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 50.
14. Norman Chachkin, History of Constitutional Litigation for Human Rights In
U.S. – Especially Race Issues, 517 PLI/LIT 417, 425 (1999).
15. See Thomas Morawetz, Fantasy, Celebrity, and Homicide, 6 HASTINGS
WOMEN’ S L.J. 209, 209-60 (1995).
16. Harry Barnes, Carter Center Symposium on the Death Penalty, 14 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 329, 372-73 (1997).
17. Id. at 372-73. The author stated:
I look at this case now of JonBenet Ramsey, where there has been
intense media attention, and I don’t want to minimize the tragedy of
that crime. But when I think about that case, I think about the dozens
of little black girls and little black boys who have been murdered in
cities across this country over the last nine months, none of whom we
can name, none of whom we can identify. And yet those crimes are no
less tragic.
Id. at 373.
18. Id. at 372-73.
19. Id. at 372 (“When [this statistic is given,] everybody is shocked, because
when they read the press, when they look at the data that is being presented to
them on an almost constant basis, the image is that all crimes are committed by
people of color against people who are white.”).
20. Id.
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who have been sentenced to death in that state have been
sentenced to death for crimes committed against people who are
21
white.” Furthermore, approximately three-quarters of those who
22
have been executed in Alabama were black. The trend is not
changing; a higher percentage of black people were executed in
23
Alabama between 1972 and 1997 than between 1930 and 1972.
The Justice Department was also able to establish that between
1930 and 1972, 89% of the people who were executed for the crime
of rape in America were black men convicted of raping white
24
women. In addition, 100% of the people executed for a rape
25
conviction perpetrated their crime on a white victim. This statistic
is even more disturbing when one considers that black women are
much more likely to be victims of sexual assault, yet the
26
punishments for their perpetrators are conspicuously less severe.
These racial disparities give a historical backdrop to the race factor
and its influence on the criminal justice system.
In the 1960s there was incredible activism to combat certain
aspects of racism (“Jim Crow” laws, racial bias, segregation laws,
27
voting challenges, etc.); however, little of this energy has been
directed toward the undercurrent of racism still flowing in the
28
courts. Today, if one had to find an area of public administration
where the remnants of slavery still survive, it would be in the
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 372-73.
Id. The Justice Department began collecting execution statistics in 1930.

Id.
24. Brittany Glidden, When the State is Silent: An Analysis of AEDPA’S
Adjudication Requirement, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 177, 203 n.149 (noting
that the Justice Department found that from 1930 until 1972, 405 of the 455
individuals sentenced to death for rape were black); see also, Michael J. Klarman,
The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the Consequences of Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 104 n.322 (discussing specifically that
black men are the only people that received the death penalty for rape, and
moreover, only for the rape of white women).
25. Klarman, supra note 24, at 104 n.322.
26. One study conducted in Philadelphia found that black women were
twelve times more likely to be raped than white women were. DONAL E.J.
M ACNAMARA & EDWARD SAGARIN, SEX , CRIME, AND THE LAW 52 (1977); Jennifer
Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN’ S L.J. 103, 122 n.118 (1983)
(stating that citizen interviews illustrate that black women are at a much higher
risk to be victims’ of rape than white women are). This is devastating to the “black
women community” considering that judges, prosecutors, juries, police officers,
and every-day citizens view rape of black women as less serious than the rape of
white women. Id.
27. See Stevenson, supra note 6.
28. Id.
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29

criminal justice system.
The courts have been reluctant to
examine this issue. The lack of judicial attention to racial injustice
can be seen in its most insidious form with the inequitable
30
administration of the death penalty.
31
Three cases highlight this point. First, in Furman v. Georgia,
opponents of the death penalty argued that the use of the death
penalty was a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
because it was arbitrary, unpredictable, and racially
32
discriminatory. To support their argument, they presented the
same type of data provided above, arguing that the respective races
of the victim and the offender was the primary variable regarding
33
administration of the death penalty. The Court accepted this data
34
and held that the death penalty was being administered unfairly.
After the Furman decision, states scrambled to pass new death
35
penalty statutes that conformed to the new decision. However,
opponents of the death penalty persisted, which brought about the
36
second case, Gregg v. Georgia. Here death penalty opponents
argued that as long as racial bias is evident in society, bias would
37
exist in criminal justice. Furthermore, they asserted that the new
death penalty statutes did not protect against a racially biased
application of the death penalty. The Court held that they were
not going to presume racism simply because it was a death penalty
38
39
case. This gave rise to the third case, McCleskey v. Kemp, which
40
embraces the critical issues of race consciousness in criminal law.
B. The McCleskey Effect
In McCleskey, opponents of the death penalty went back to the
Supreme Court with data that examined every homicide in Georgia
that occurred in a seven-year period and came up with extremely
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
32. Id. at 239.
33. Id. at 250.
34. Id. at 248.
35. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that statutory factors
of aggravation and mitigation were constitutional despite contention that statute
permitted arbitrary and freakish imposition of the death penalty).
36. Id. at 179-80.
37. Id. at 175-207.
38. Id.
39. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
40. Id.
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powerful data demonstrating that a black perpetrator is eleven
times more likely to get the death penalty than a white criminal
41
charged with the same crime. Moreover, a black defendant is
twenty-two times more likely to get the death penalty if the victim is
42
white.
The data shows that race was the greatest predictor of who
43
received the death penalty in the state of Georgia. In addition, it
is important to point out that the Court accepted the data as
presented; it did not challenge the numbers and accepted the fact
that there was sufficient evidence proving race played a factor in
the administration of the death penalty. However, the Court
44
refused to order a stay on the execution on two grounds. First,
the Court reasoned that a stay on executions would open a
Pandora’s box. Clever lawyers would respond to a stay with
evidence of disparity in other crimes and disrupt many areas of the
45
justice system other than capital cases.
Justice Brennan
responded to this notion by saying that the Court has a “fear of too
46
much justice.” Second, the Court reasoned that a certain amount
47
of racial bias is “inevitable.”
C. The Impact of McCleskey
When one thinks about McCleskey, one thinks about abdication
48
-- a concession to racial bias. In Brown v. Board of Education the
Court was faced with a situation where it could have said that a
certain amount of racial bias is “inevitable,” and that the problem is
too big for the Court. Instead, the Court said that depriving a child
of an equal opportunity to an education because of the color of his
49
or her skin was unconstitutional and wrong. Thus, because it was
50
unconstitutional it was not inevitable.
Although these cases
address substantially different factual situations and sought
different outcomes, they contain the same core questions of
equality and fairness. Yet, in one case the Court was willing to stay
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 286.
Id.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 279-82.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 339 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Id. at 312.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 495-96.
See id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss3/5

8

Rizer: The Race Effect on Wrongful Convictions
RIZER ARTICLE FORMATTED CURRENT.DOC

2003]

2/7/2003 2:26 PM

THE RACE EFFECT ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

853

for the long fight in the interest of justice and fairness while in the
other case the Court retreated from a commitment to equal justice
and equal opportunity.
The most important impact of McCleskey is the attitude it sets.
The case established the basis for how race continues to undermine
the hope of minorities who are brought before the criminal courts.
By tolerating a presumption of criminality that is assigned to
minority defendants, the indifference the criminal justice system
creates an atmosphere where the innocent have an increased
likelihood of wrongful conviction.
III. EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY AND CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION
Few studies have focused on the ability of Hispanic, Native
American, or Asian individuals to accurately identify other races or
51
be accurately identified. Thus, this section will primarily focus on
cross-racial identification between white witnesses and black
suspects.
“There has been a growing body of social science research that
reveals the important role in which race plays in assessing the
reliability of a witness identification when the witness and the
52
person identified are of the same or of different races.” As a
result of this research, it is conclusive that race influences the
53
accuracy of witness identification.
A. Wrongful Convictions Due to Faulty Eyewitness Testimony
Eyewitness testimony is the most influential evidence for
54
55
juries. Ironically, this same testimony is extremely unreliable.
There is “no clear method for estimating the frequency of wrongful
56
accusations based [solely] on faulty eyewitness testimony.”
However, the evidence shows that eyewitness testimony is
unreliable. Because juries rely heavily on unreliable eyewitness
testimony as a basis for conviction, the role it plays in wrongful
convictions is clear. In fact, 74% of wrongful convictions that were
vindicated due to DNA testing had the element of a bad
51. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 934, 938-41 (1984).
52. Gee, supra note 4, at 835.
53. Id. at 850-51.
54. Loftus, supra, note 5.
55. Gee, supra note 4, at 837.
56. Id. at 836.
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57

eyewitness.
The problem with eyewitness identification is embedded in
58
psychology. For example:
When a witness to a crime must later identify the person
who was seen before, various psychological factors can
play an important role: the retention interval or period of
time between the crime and the identification; the
exposure time and amount of time that the witness has
had to look at the essential subject; prior knowledge;
expectations; misleading suggestions; and stress . . . .
[T]hese factors will operate to reduce the accuracy of an
identification,
just as they affect the accuracy of any kind
59
of testimony.
The inherent unreliability of this kind of testimony makes the
admission of this evidence in criminal trials problematic; this
problem is enhanced in situations involving cross-racial
identifications.
B. Faulty Eyewitness Testimony in Cross-Racial Identification
Increases Wrongful Convictions Among Minorities
William Jackson spent five years in an Ohio penitentiary on a
60
spurious rape charge before being released. The real rapist did
not particularly look like Mr. Jackson. Nevertheless, two white
women swore under oath that Mr. Jackson was the man who raped
61
them. They were wrong. Despite Mr. Jackson’s several alibi
62
witnesses, the (all white) jury convicted him. These types of
misidentifications are neither unique nor rare. “Legal observers
have long recognized that cross-racial identifications by witnesses
63
are disproportionately responsible for wrongful convictions.”
57. Michael J. Saks & Lauri Constantine, Model Prevention and Remedy of
Erroneous Convictions Act, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 665, 674 (2001).
Many crimes leave no biological evidence. Because there is no DNA to
test, many erroneous convictions can never be uncovered by later DNA
testing and the victims of those errors will never be exonerated. In
addition, now that DNA is used more routinely, the prominence of
discovered errors will decline or disappear, yet most of the systemic
causes of error will continue to generate errors.
Id.
58. Gee, supra note 4, at 837.
59. Id. at 837-38.
60. Johnson, supra note 51, at 935.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 935-36.
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People make identifications by recognizing facial features.
Those of one race have a harder time recognizing faces of people
65
from different races. It is not totally understood if this is due to
prejudices or from having fewer experiences with members of
66
other races.
It is not clear why one person can more easily
67
identify someone from the same race. Psychologists believe two
reasonable explanations exist: “[1] different races often have
distinctive features in common; and [2] people make more
mistakes in cross-racial identification” situations due to a decrease
68
in attention to people of other races.
What is clear is that there are discrepancies in cross-racial
identification, and those discrepancies have crept into our criminal
justice system in the form of eyewitness testimony.
C. Solutions and Safeguards
One suggestion towards alleviating the problem is to help, not
hinder, jury education. First, permit the defense to “present
psychological testimony about the factors that affect the reliability
69
of eyewitness accounts,” particularly the problems associated with
70
cross-racial identification. Second, allow for jury instructions that
inform the jury of this problematic evidence and that they should
71
weigh the evidence accordingly.
In addition, steps should be taken to ensure that the police
conduct correct lineups (both actual and photo). There is no
point in compounding the problem with unfair lineups that
72
increase the defendant’s chances of being erroneously identified.
Courts have already applied procedural safeguards to prevent
erroneous identifications. One such safeguard is the defendant’s
73
right to counsel at post-indictment line-ups. Another is the due
process fairness requirement in all identification proceedings,
64. Gee, supra note 4, at 843.
65. Id. at 843-44.
66. Id. at 844.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 849.
70. Id. at 841-49.
71. For example, a sample jury instruction could read: “Members of the Jury,
it has been shown that cross-cultural identifications are less reliable than
identifications where there are no cross-racial implications.”
72. Gee, supra note 4, at 841-42.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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including uncounseled photo arrays and pre-indictment line-ups.
If these safeguards are breached, the evidence will be deemed
inadmissible at a suppression hearing. In order to further
eliminate racial bias, these safeguards should be enforced more
rigorously.
Finally, some argue that there should be an outright exclusion
75
of inherently untrustworthy identification evidence. At the very
least, there should be required collaboration for the admission of
76
eyewitness testimony. However, neither remedy is likely to be
universally adopted and both are inappropriate for selective
77
application to cross-racial identifications.
IV. IT IS BETTER TO BE RICH AND GUILTY THAN POOR, INNOCENT,
AND A MINORITY
By some accounts the title of Jeffrey Reiman’s book, “The Rich
Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison,” gives a good prelude to justice in
78
America. One fact that puts this into perspective is that 51% of
the people executed in America were executed in the state of
79
Mississippi and its fellow southern states.
Compensation for
lawyers appointed to try capital cases in Mississippi is capped at
80
$3,500. In Alabama, lawyers representing post-conviction death
81
row inmates cannot be paid more than $1000. For states that
report how much they spend on capital punishment trials, the
average cost is $40,750almost $40,000 over the post-conviction
82
cap in Alabama.
This section will show that people in poverty are at a much
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
Johnson, supra note 51, at 957.
Id. at 958.
Id.
JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON:
IDEOLOGY, CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (4th ed. 1995).
79. Margaret Vandiver & Michel Coconis, “Sentenced to the Punishment of
Death”: Pre-Furman Capital Crimes and Executions in Shelby County, Tennessee, 31 U.
M EM. L. REV. 861, 864 n.11 (2001). The fellow southern states are Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Id. at n.10.
80. Keith B. Norman, Kudos! H.B. 53 Becomes Law, ALA. LAW., July 1999, at
220. The previous cap had been $1000. Id.
81. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE OF ALABAMA, REPRESENTATION OF DEATH ROW
PRISONERS, available at http://www.eji.org/representation.html.
82. Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of SubMinimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 281, 313
n.123 (1991).
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greater risk to be wrongfully convicted. Further, it is well
documented that minorities are disproportionately poor. Thus, if
the dots are connected from the lack of justice for the poor to
poverty rampant in minority communities, coupled with the fact
that minorities warm a lot of beds in prison, it can be deduced that
minorities are at a higher risk of being wrongfully convicted.
A. Wrongful Convictions and the Impoverished in America
There are many factors that account for the wrongful
convictions of poor people. The most prevalent are the lack of
competent counsel, the lack of resources, police misconduct, the
focus of law enforcement, and a general lack of credibility given the
impoverished by society.
Many people clutch their pocketbooks or keep an eye over
their shoulder when a street person is walking close by. Why is this?
This author believes that people in poverty have an automatic lack
of credibility in this society. The general public harbors a
chauvinism that criminals are usually poor. Thus, poor people get
83
treated like criminals.
With the lack of credibility comes a host of other problems,
84
such as police misconduct in the gathering of confessions. Based
on what has been learned from DNA exonerations, 44% of
wrongful convictions involved false confessions obtained through
85
police misconduct.
There is a considerable amount of evidence to indicate that
the criminal justice system benefits the rich, not the poor, because:
the wealthy benefit from a criminal justice system that
sends the message that it is the poor, not the rich, who
commit crimes and whom the middle class should fear.
As a result of the criminal justice system’s focus on street
crime and not “white collar” or environmental crime, it is
the poor who seem a threat to the social order, not the
rich; and this view reinforces the familiar American
association between wealth and virtue, poverty and moral
bankruptcy . . . . “If we can convince [society] that the
poor are poor because of their own shortcomings,
83. See Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50
M ERCER L. REV. 443, 455 (1999).
84. See Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just
Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 724 n.170 (1996).
85. Saks & Constantine, supra note 57 at 64.
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particularly moral shortcomings like incontinence and
indolence, then we need acknowledge no . . .
responsibility to the poor.” [The result is that] “the
ultimate sanctions of criminal justice dramatically sanctify
the present social and economic order, and the poverty of
criminals
makes poverty itself an individual moral
86
crime!”
Perhaps the major deterrent to obtaining justice for indigent
87
defendants is the lack of competent lawyers to represent them.
Since most people who are charged with crimes are poor, most
88
lawyers who represent them are public defenders. The public
defender system has many problems in itself. For instance, the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers issued a warning
in 1997 that “such low-bid contracting, designed to ‘process the
maximum number of defendants at the lowest cost-without regard
to truth, justice, or innocence’ was violating citizens’ rights and
89
leading to wrongful convictions.” It is estimated that 28% of
wrongful convictions are in part or directly a result of shoddy
90
defense work.
Another factor that compounds the lack of competent counsel
91
is the limit put on resources to support a meaningful defense. All
defendants are entitled to a forceful defense, and it is practically
impossible to assemble a compelling defense without access to
some of the multitude of assets that are accessible to the state. This
problem is exponentially amplified in the case of poor defendants.
B. Minorities and Poverty in America
Minorities make up 19.7% of the population in the United

86. Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice as Environmental Justice, 1 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 1, 10-11 (1997) (quoting REIMAN, supra note 78, at 142).
87. See Dirk Johnson, Shoddy Defense by Lawyers Puts Innocents on Death Row, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000, at A1 (noting that despite heightened concern about
inadequate legal representation and wrongful convictions in death penalty cases,
funding for several legal aid organizations has been cut and eliminated in recent
years).
88. Smith & Montross, supra note 83, at 455.
89. Stephen B. Bright, Glimpses at a Dream Yet to be Realized, CHAMPION, Mar.
1998, at 14.
90. Saks & Constantine, supra note 57, at 674.
91. Amber J. McGraw, Life But Not Liberty? An Assessment of Noncapital Indigent
Defendants’ Rights to Expert Assistance Under the Ake v. Oklahoma Doctrine, 79 WASH.
U.L.Q. 951, 952-53 (2001).
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92

States with blacks making up the largest fraction of minorities at
93
12.1%.
Among minority groups, American Indians living in
94
poverty are three times the national average. In the ten largest
cities, blacks constitute 32% of the poor and nationwide they are
95
29% of those that are impoverished. This is approximately three
96
times the poverty level of white Americans.
As stated, the poor are predominantly represented by public
97
criminal defense lawyers. “The clients of [these] criminal defense
lawyers are not only predominantly poor, but they are also
98
disproportionately nonwhite.” This is not surprising in view of the
composition of American cities. The result of this poverty and
other elements discussed is that minorities experience an increased
likelihood of being wrongfully convicted because they are more
likely to be poor.
C. Prisons in America
The connection between poverty, minority status, and
wrongful convictions is highlighted by looking at the prison
population in this country. America had about 330,000 people in
99
prison in 1972. The incarceration rate grew to nearly 1.8 million
100
in 1998, of which minorities made up 58.7% of the prison
populace, with blacks at 41.2% and whites at 41.3%. Thus, there
are 6.6 times more white people in the United States but only 0.1%
101
more of them in prison than black people.

92. 2000 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU REP.
93. Id.
94. Larry EchoHawk, Child Sexual Abuse in Indian Country: Is the Guardian
Keeping in Mind the Seventh Generation?, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’ Y 83, 91 n.43
(2001).
95. Pamela J. Smith, Teaching the Retrenchment Generation: When Sapphire Meets
Socrates at the Intersection of Race, Gender, and Authority, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
53, 92 n. 154 (1999) (citing Martin Gilens, Race and Poverty in America: Public
Misperceptions and the American News Media, 60 PUB. OPINION Q. 515, 527-36
(1996)). Interestingly, blacks are pictured as being poor 62% of the time in print
media and 65% of the time in the news. Id.
96. Cass R. Sunstein, Well-Being and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1314
n.41 (1994).
97. Smith & Montross, supra note 83, at 455.
98. Id.
99. Stephen C. Thaman, Is America a Systematic Violator of Human Rights in the
Administration of Criminal Justice?, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 999, 1015 n.147 (2000).
100. Id.
101. 2000 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU REP.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

15

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 5
RIZER ARTICLE FORMATTED CURRENT.DOC

860

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

2/7/2003 2:26 PM

[Vol. 29:3

D. Suggestions and Solutions
This is an embedded social issue, one that needs to be
addressed on the most basic levels of fundamental fairness and
respect for fellow humans. While this country has come a long way
with issues of racism through education and a public focus on
diversity, there needs to be an equally strong focus on
understanding those who are poor. We also should enact zerotolerance policies for police misconduct (the extraction of false
confessions in particular). This can be accomplished by legislating
civil remedies, by firing rogue police officers, and, in some cases, by
criminal prosecution for the worst offenders. Attracting public
defenders who care about the system by increasing their pay and
“prestige” in society would also begin to address this problem. We
should ban, or at least modify, caps on the monetary resources
allowed public defenders. After all, access to justice comes at a
price. Finally, we should search for ways to help public prosecutors
to seek justice, rather than rewarding only the highest conviction
rates.
V. INSTITUTIONALIZED RACISM THAT IMPACTS MINORITIES BEING
W RONGFULLY CONVICTED
The inherent racism in the criminal justice system may be the
most damaging. Part II addressed the “inevitable” amount of
racism that is tolerated within the system; this section will address
specifics aspects of the criminal justice system and how they
contribute to racial disparities in wrongful convictions.
A. Congress / Legislature
Lawmakers of this country have been on a crusade to
criminalize some varieties of behavior, most notably with the drug
laws. The issues relating to the war on drugs will be addressed in
this section because they are legislative-based movements.
The drug laws are discriminatorily designed in their very basis.
As public knowledge grew about crack and its effects on criminal
102
behavior in the 1980s, so did legislative concern.
The public
102. Matthew F. Leitman, A Proposed Standard of Equal Protection Review for
Classifications Within the Criminal Justice System That Have a Racially Disparate Impact:
A Case Study of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Classifications Between Crack and
Powder Cocaine, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 215, 215 (1994).
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wanted action against the crack epidemic, and Congress
103
responded with laws mandating much stiffer penalties against
104
crack cocaine than its powder counterpart.
These harsher penalties had a disparate effect on the black
community. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines mandate a
minimum five-year and maximum twenty-year imprisonment term
105
for simple possession of five grams or more of crack cocaine.
Thus, the sentence for possession of one gram of crack cocaine is
equal to the sentence for possession of 100 grams of powder
106
cocaine. This particularly impacts the black community because
91% of those who are charged with crack-related offenses are
107
black.
Conversely, those charged with possession of powder
108
cocaine are predominately white.
Another example that exhibits this disparity is the “meth war.”
By some accounts, Methamphetamine, or crystal meth, is
109
considered one of the most devastating drugs available to users.
Yet the sentencing related to this drug is minimal, even though its
presence is considered an epidemic. Is it any coincidence that its
users are predominantly white?
Partly due to these guidelines, incarceration is at a historic
high, particularly among blacks. This fuels the perception and
presumption that minorities are mostly criminals. Thus, the
current crack laws have created an environment with a substantially
greater risk of wrongful conviction based upon race-biased
suspicions for people of color.
An easy solution to this quandary is to simply standardize the
punishment. Although this would not prevent blacks from going to
jail, it would make their powder cocaine counterpart users equally
culpable.
B. The Prosecutor
Another fact that has been learned from DNA exonerations is
that 40% of wrongful convictions contain an element of
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL §§ 2D1.1(a)(3), 2D1.1(c)(8)
(1996). For the sentencing table, see id. at ch. 5, Pt. A.
106. Id. § 2D1.1(a)(3).
107. Leitman, supra, note 102, at 216.
108. Id.
109. Irene Edicott & Lisa Vares, Help Win the War on Meth, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Jan. 31, 2003, at B7.
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110

prosecutorial misconduct. The obvious case where this happens
is where the prosecutor himself is racist and prosecutes because of
the defendant’s race and not the likelihood of guilt. The more
subtle and harmful problem is the prosecutor’s discriminatory use
111
of peremptory strikes in jury selection. In Batson v. Kentucky, the
Supreme Court said that the discriminatory use of preemptory
112
strikes was unconstitutional. The Batson decision laid out a threestep test to determine whether the state’s employment of
peremptory challenges is a violation of the Fourteenth
113
Amendment.
First, the defense must show intentional racial
114
discrimination. Second, once the defense has made this showing,
the burden then shifts to the prosecution to offer a race-neutral
115
reason for the challenge.
Lastly, the court determines if the
116
explanation is race-neutral or racial discrimination.
Prosecutors, however, can get around this mandate by stating
117
racially-neutral reasons for excusing prospective jurors.
A
problem with this is that many courts consider almost anything
other than an overt statement such as “I want him off because he is
118
black” as a race-neutral reason.
As a result, many black
110. Saks & Constantine, supra note 57, at 673-74.
111. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
112. Id. at 88 (stating that a peremptory challenge used to bar persons from
the jury based on gender or race is a violation of the 14th Amendment).
113. Id. at 96.
114. Id. The defendant must show: (1) the defendant is from a recognized
racial group; (2) that group has been excluded from the jury; and (3) the nature
of the case indicates that the exclusion was race motivated. Id. This has been
expanded since Batson to include the defendant’s ability to object even if the
defendant and the removed juror do not share the same racial background. See,
e.g. Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a
white defendant was allowed to challenge the exclusion of black juror). The
Batson decision has also been expanded to allow the prosecution to challenge the
defendant’s use of challenges when racially motivated. See, e.g., United States v.
Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1994).
115. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
116. Id. at 98.
117. Gamble v. State, 357 S.E.2d 792, 794-95 (Ga. 1987).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
that there was no suggestion of discrimination because rate of challenges was not
considerably higher than minority percentage of the population); Cent. Ala. Fair
Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Lowder Realty Co., 236 F.3d 629, 636-38 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding that there was no inference of discrimination when plaintiffs in civil
rights case used peremptory challenges to strike Caucasian jurors); Pemberthy v.
Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 872 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that there was no inference of
discrimination when the state used peremptory challenges to exclude prospective
jurors who were Spanish speaking because both Spanish speaking Latino and non-
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defendants are tried by a panel of all white jurors. A perfect
illustration of this can be seen in the 1996 motion picture, A Time to
Kill, when the defendant, a black man, looks at his all white jury
119
and asks, “This is a jury of my peers?”
120
In Booker v. Jabe, the prosecutor exercised twenty-six of his
allotted thirty peremptory challenges; twenty-two of those
challenges were used against black jurors. The end result was an all
121
white jury.
Prosecutorial misconduct also results in wrongful convictions
when race is injected in a trial in a prejudicial manner. For
122
instance, in Russell v. Collins the prosecutor said in his closing
arguments, “Can you imagine the fear that [the victim] went
123
through . . . with three blacks[?]” This was asked to an all white
124
jury when referring to a white victim.
These comments are
especially exasperating to defendants because appellate courts
refuse to remedy the situation, instead employing the harmless
125
error doctrine and not reversing the conviction. In Russell, the
Fifth Circuit deemed the comments “regrettable” in a footnote
126
giving a cursory glance at its impact.
Blatant prosecutorial racism that leads to wrongful convictions
can be addressed by eliminating prosecutors’ shields from civil and
criminal liability. Simple misconduct can be somewhat thwarted
with other disciplinary actions, including termination. Courts
could also prevent such misconduct leading to wrongful
convictions by being willing to prevent the use of peremptory
strikes when they appear to be racially based. This author believes
a common sense approach would be sufficient. Further, courts
could use the same common sense approach to stop prosecutors

Latino jurors stricken); Mitchell v. Rees, 114 F.3d 571, 578 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that there was no inference of discrimination when no black persons
were on jury and prosecutor exercised challenges to strike black jurors); United
States v. Hartsfield, 976 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that there
was no inference of discrimination because jury contained five jurors with
Hispanic last names and two alternates with Hispanic first or last names).
119. A TIME TO KILL (Warner Brother Studios 1996).
120. 775 F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 1985).
121. Id. at 764.
122. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Russell v. Collins, 944 F.2d 202 (5th
Cir. 1991) (No. 10,560), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1278 (1991).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 944 F.2d at 204 n. 1.
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from using racially charged language in order to exaggerate jurors’
fears and reservations by judicial intervention at the moment the
comment is made and even calling a mistrial if the misconduct is
severe. In addition, appellate courts could give due weight to the
issue and refrain from automatically deeming such conduct
harmless.
C. The Court / Judges
It has been said that, as a minority, you should be more
concerned with people wearing black robes than those wearing
127
white ones.
The judicial system has shown an indifference to
128
certain levels of racism through the “inevitable” doctrine and, in
accepting race as a legitimate category for suspicion, by tolerating
129
racial profiling.
These indifferences show up in ways that are disempowering to
minorities. For example, in Peek v. State the judge, who was sitting
over a capital case said, “Since the nigger mom and dad are here
anyway, why don’t we go ahead and do the penalty phase today
130
instead of having to subpoena them back at cost to the state.” If
the judge had been a businessman for a major corporation, he
would have been fired, but in a system where racial bias is
“inevitable,” biased people can continue to preside over our courts.
Some solutions to this particular problem may be unrealistic
because of their side effects. One suggestion is to limit the liability
shield of judges. Another is to remove judges who show a tendency
for racial bias. Further, there is an argument to mandate a reversal
where the judge makes racially motivated comments during the
proceeding.
D. The Jury
“Many jurors harbor racial prejudices. Although these
131
prejudices are often subtle,” and other times overt, they
127. See Stevenson, supra note 6.
128. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987).
129. See State v. Ruiz, 504 P.2d 1307 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (stating that
Hispanic persons were properly stopped where it was officers’ experience that it
was unusual for persons other than black people to frequent the area except for
purpose of buying drugs).
130. 488 So.2d 52, 56 (Fla. 1986). This judge was re-elected, and is currently
sitting on the bench.
131. Development in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process: Racist Juror Misconduct
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132

contaminate the jury behind the curtain of jury deliberation.
Thus, it is imperative that attorneys eliminate prospective jurors
before they are shielded by the deliberation room door.
Juries are more likely to convict a person of another race than
133
of their own. “Because most juries are predominantly white, even
when only marginal evidence is provided,” black defendants are
134
acquitted less often than white ones. Furthermore, if the victim is
135
white, a black defendant’s chances of an acquittal are even less.
The races of the defendant and the victim play a major role in
136
wrongful convictions. A study done in 1978 by Marina Miller and
137
Jay Hewitt demonstrates this phenomenon. The study was of 133
138
college students. They were told to pretend they were jurors and
then were shown a videotape of a case involving a black man
139
charged with the rape of a thirteen-year-old girl.
Half of the
study participants were told that the girl was black and the other
140
half were told she was white.
Miller and Hewitt found that both [b]lack and [w]hite
students tended to convict more often when they shared
racial affinity with the victim. Sixty-five percent of the
During Deliberations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1595, 1595 (1988).
132. Id.
133. Gee, supra note 4, at 842.
134. Id. The statistic holds true for black jurors in trials of black defendants.
See Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841,
880 (1997) (proposing that requiring majority black juries to hear cases involving
African-American criminal defendants “would be in keeping with civil affirmative
action’s goal of correcting ongoing racial discrimination. Several scholars have
documented white juror prejudice against black criminal defendants. Majority
black juries would prevent conviction and punishment based on this prejudice.”).
135. Id.
136. As in the case involving O. J. Simpson, “[o]nce a defendant is charged it is
virtually impossible to prevent race from entering other phases of the trial.”
Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial Charging
Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion-Knowing There Will Be Consequences
for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371, 387-88 (2000); see also, Richard A. Boswell,
Crossing the Racial Divide: Challenging Stereotypes About Black Jurors, 6 HASTINGS
WOMEN’ S L.J. 233, 235-36 (1995) (“Even before the trial, there was speculation that
the prosecution would be prevented from obtaining a conviction if the death
penalty was requested . . . .”).
137. Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Race and the Victim: An Examination of Capital Sentencing
and Guilt Attribution Studies, 73 CHI. KENT L. REV. 533, 543 (1998).
138. Id.
139. Id. The make up of the study was “eighty-three women, approximately
half of whom were Black and half of whom were White, and fifty men, half of
whom were Black and half of whom were White.” Id.
140. Id.
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[w]hite students voted for conviction when they thought
the victim was [w]hite, but only 32% voted for conviction
when they thought the victim was [b]lack. Eighty percent
of the [b]lack students voted for conviction when they
thought the victim was [b]lack, but only 48% voted 141
for
conviction when they thought the victim was [w]hite.
To help alleviate this problem, the court should strive to
maintain a jury pool whose makeup reflects the community at
large. Further, the system should take on the responsibility of
obtaining participation from minorities in the trial process.
Attorneys should use voir dire to examine prospective jurors with
regard to racial biases, because jurors will usually give only slight
inferences to such biases in their examination. Also, attorneys
should attempt to create a comfort zone so that jurors feel free to
talk about race. Moreover, attorneys should not be too narrowminded about who they believe could be a racist. Prospective
jurors are not likely to come in with white robes or with swastika
tattooed on their foreheads.
VI. CONCLUSION
“‘Symbolic racists’ do not express blatantly racist attitudes
because it is no longer socially acceptable to do so, while ‘aversive
racists’ believe that they are not racist even while holding racist
142
beliefs.”
Regardless of how social scientists label it, it is agreed
that a shift has occurred in the way racists express their racist
143
attitudes. This attitude is spilling over into the criminal justice
system at the expense of innocent people of color. It is affecting
people like Walther McMillan, who spent six years on death row
even though he had thirty-five alibi witnesses to prove his
144
innocence.
Avoiding wrongful convictions is not just about the innocent
souls who are trapped by it. It is also a law-and-order issue: when
141. Id.
142. Risa L. Golubogg, Reckoning with Race and Criminal Justice, 106 YALE L.J.
2299, 2303-04 (1997) (reviewing JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICANAMERICAN M ALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, (1996). “The theory of ‘symbolic
racism’ posits that whites express negative feelings toward blacks indirectly rather
than directly.” Id. at 2304 n.26. “‘Aversive racists’ believe that they are not
prejudiced, but they retain subtly racist attitudes because of the historically
embedded racist culture of the United States.” Id. at n.27.
143. Id. at 2304.
144. See Stevenson, supra note 6.
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innocent people go to jail, the real killers or rapists are still on the
loose and free to break the law anew. In the McMillan case, the real
killer had six years to commit other crimes. Avoiding wrongful
convictions also is essential to the social contract that we all have
with our government. If we lose faith in the belief that the criminal
system is attempting to represent “justice,” how many will embrace
radical, even revolutionary, methods to obtain the justice they feel
eludes them?
This concern is especially relevant in the aftermath of
September 11. There is a high potential for arbitrary and
capricious convictions based on emotion and fear, rather than
justice and due process. While protecting against terrorism is
paramount to this nation, faith in a fair system is equally
145
imperative.

145. The issue of wrongful convictions has mainly been one that follows the
liberal ideology. However, this author contends that it is also a conservative /
Republican issue as well. The conservative platform is one of limited government keeping our government from making arbitrary and capricious decisions. If
government is allowed to put innocent citizens in jail (and in some cases kill
them) due to social injustices, laziness, racial motivation, and because they can get
away with it, we are expanding government’s power immensely. Taking one’s
liberty or life is the ultimate power.
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